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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2A-ll/16/82 
ROCHESTER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 616, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO CASE NO. D-0202 
upon the Charge of Violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
In the Matter of 
TEACHERS AIDES ASSOCIATION OF 
ROCHESTER, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO CASE NO. D-0203 
upon the Charge of Violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law 
MARTIN L. BARR, ESQ. (JEROME THIER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ. (GERARD JOHN DEWOLF, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
In separate charges filed on October 22, 1980,- Counsel to this 
Board (Charging Party) alleged that the Rochester Teachers Association, 
Local 616, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (RTA) and the Teachers Aides Association 
of Rochester, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (TAAR) caused, instigated, encouraged, 
condoned and engaged in an eight-day strike against the City School 
District of the City of Rochester (District) on September 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 
9, 10 and 11, 1980. After a consolidated hearing on the two charges, the 
hearins officer determined that the evidence established that 
±/Prosecution of these cases was held in abeyance during settlement 
discussions. 
Board - D-0202, D-0203 -2 
both RTA and TAAR engaged in an unprovoked strike against the District 
which they refused to end until negotiations yielded contractual 
agreements. 
FACTS 
Collective bargaining agreements between the District and each of 
the two associations expired on June 30, 1980, and as of the date of the 
opening of schoolinSeptember 1980, successor agreements had not yet 
been negotiated. While classes were scheduled to commence on 
September 3, 1980, the evidence indicates that both teachers and aides 
2/ 
had been expected to attend on September 2, 1980.— On that day, as on 
the first seven days of classes, about 80 percent of the District's 2,300 
teachers and 500 aides were absent. Among the teachers who were absent 
throughout this period were four of the five officers of RTA. TAAR had 
no board of directors or officers during this period, but the chairperson 
of its negotiating committee and four of the other seven members of that 
committee were among the absent aides throughout the period. The mass 
absenteeism of both teachers and aides ended immediately after the 
District concluded a collective bargaining agreement with RTA and TAAR 
and there is no evidence that any officers or leaders of either RTA or 
TAAR attempted to persuade unit employees to return to work before the 
new agreements were concluded. 
On these facts, the hearing officer determined that the mass 
absenteeism constituted a strike and that RTA and TAAR engaged in 
^September 1, 1980 fell on Labor Day and the District's attendance 
records indicate that the teachers and aides did not attend school by 
reason of the holiday. For September 2, the District's attendance 
records note that teachers and aides who did not attend were absent. The 
absent teachers and aides were penalized under §210.2 of the Taylor Law, 
except for those relatively few teachers and aides who persuaded the 
District their absences on September 2 were not related to the mass 
absenteeism. 
'IM 
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it.- In arguments presented to this Board, RTA and TAAR assert that 
i the statistical data concerning teacher absenteeism, which was relied 
upon by the hearing officer, is not reliable. RTA and TAAR assert that 
the record does not establish that teacher or aide attendance was 
required before classes were scheduled on September 3, 1980. They 
further argue that the strike was without impact because a full instruc-
tional ^  to the students of the Distriet for at least 
180 days. 
DISCUSSION 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the hearing officer's 
findings of fact and his conclusion that RTA and TAAR engaged in an 
eight-day strike from September 2, 1980 through September 11, 1980. We 
further conclude that the strike had a severe impact upon the educational 
program of the District throughout its duration and especially on its 
) 
last four days when, because of staff absences, the District was forced 
to close its schools to students. 
In determining the penalty to be imposed upon the two associa-
tions, we note that RTA, but not TAAR, had engaged in a prior strike in 
4/ 
violation of the Taylor Law.-
The Board noted when the prior strike came before it that the 
impact on the welfare of the community was negligible and that on one of 
2/RTA, but not TAAR, was found to be in contempt of court for 
violating an injunction by engaging in a strike. The hearing officer 
ruled that "by reason of the court determination" RTA "is estopped 
collaterally from disputing its responsibility for the strike." RTA has 
filed an exception to that ruling. We find merit in RTA's position on 
this point. See Board of Education UFSD No. 4 v. PERB, 74 Misc2d 741 
(Westchester County, 1973), 6 PERB 1(7007. Accordingly, we do not treat 
the finding of the court as binding upon us. 
—^RTA engaged in a two-day strike on March 2 and 3, 1970. 
Rochester Teachers Association, 4 PERB 1(3050 (1971) . 
•5*862 
Board - D-0202, D-0203 
the two days, the strike in fact had averted a danger to students. In 
view of the circumstances of that strike and the ten year strike-free 
interval since that time, we deem it appropriate to diminish the penalty 
we would ordinarily impose for a second strike. When a striking employee 
organization has engaged in a prior strike, we have normally ordered the 
suspension of dues deduction and agency shop fee privileges for an 
indefinite period of time. We do not do so in the instant case, but 
order the forfeiture of RTA's privileges for twelve months. In the case 
of TAAR, for which the instant strike is a first offense, we order the 
forfeiture of its dues deduction and agency shop fee privileges for nine 
months. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the District cease deducting dues 
and agency shop fee payments on behalf of the 
) Rochester Teachers Association for a period of 
twelve months, commencing on the first practicable 
date after this decision. Thereafter, no dues or 
agency shop fee payments will be deducted on its 
behalf until the Association affirms that it no 
longer asserts the right to strike against any 
government, as required by §210.3(g) of the Taylor 
Law. 
WE FURTHER ORDER that the District cease deducting 
dues or agency shop fee payments on behalf of the 
Teachers Aides Association of Rochester for a 
period of nine months, commencing on the first 
practicable date after this decision. Thereafter, 
no dues or agency shop fee payments will be 
deducted on its behalf until the Association •*" 
affirms that it no longer asserts the right to '*"*• 
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strike against any government, as required by 
§210.3(g) of the Taylor Law. 
-5 
DATED: November 16, 1982 
New York, New York 
Ida Klaus, Member 
<h*-
David C. Randies, MSmber 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of //2B-11/16/82 




TRIBOROUGH BRIDGE AND TUNNEL AUTHORITY, 
Charging Party. 
CASE NO. U-6024 
BIAGGI AND EHRLICH, ESQS. (BRUCE A. 
TORINO, ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
JOSEPH BULGATZ, ESQ., for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Bridge and Tunnel 
Officers Benevolent Association, Inc. (Association) to a hearing officer's 
decision that two negotiation demands which it presented to the Triborough 
Bridge and Tunnel Authority (Authority) were not mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. The charge, which was brought by the Authority, alleges that 
the Association improperly insisted upon the negotiation of nine 
nonmandatory demands in that the Association presented the demands to a fact 
finder.— One of these, Demand 9, would provide: 
i/The hearing officer found merit in seven specifications of the 
charge, but dismissed two on the ground that the demands constituted 
mandatory subjects of negotiation. In a related case that was consolidated 
for decision by the hearing officer, the Association charged the Authority 
with insisting upon the negotiation of two nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation. The charge was dismissed by the hearing officer who found that 
both the demands constituted mandatory subjects of negotiation. Our 
decision is limited to a consideration of those parts of the hearing 
officer's decision that were brought to us by the exceptions of the 
Association. •'••£-
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All temporary bridge and tunnel officers shall receive all forms 
of monetary compensation, all fringe benefits, and all leave 
benefits currently in force for permanent bridge and tunnel 
officers. 
The hearing officer ruled that it was not a mandatory subject of negotiation 
because it—dealt-with the terms and—cbndi-tions of employment of temporary 
bridge and tunnel officers and that the temporary officers are not in the 
negotiating unit represented by the Association. 
The other, Demand 19, would provide: 
A bridge and tunnel officer assigned to operate a specific toll 
lane shall be required to operate his toll lane only, and shall 
not be held responsible in any manner for the operation of any 
other toll lane. 
The hearing officer ruled that it was not a mandatory subject of negotiation 
because it constitutes an attempt to interfere with the Authority's right to 
deploy its staff. 
The Association argues that the hearing officer erred in concluding 
that temporary bridge and tunnel officers are not in the negotiating unit 
represented by the Association. In support of this argument, it points to 
the language of its certification which refers to "all bridge and tunnel 
officers". Alternatively, it contends, if the temporary officers were not 
in the unit at the time of the certification, they came to be unit employees 
thereafter as evidenced by the fact that their terms and conditions of 
employment have been dealt with in negotiations between the Authority and 
the Association. Finally, it asserts that temporary officers and permanent 
Board - U-6024 
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bridge and tunnel officers should be in the same unit because they share a 
community of interest. 
We reject all three arguments of the Association. It is clear that the 
Association was not seeking to represent temporary officers at the time when 
it petitioned for certification. The number of employees claimed in the 
Association's petition corresponded with the number of permanent bridge and 
tunnel officers and temporaries were not admitted to membership in the 
Association at that time. Moreover, references to terms and conditions of 
temporary bridge and tunnel officers in agreements negotiated by the 
Authority and the Association have been for the benefit of permanent bridge 
and tunnel officers only, and not for the benefit of the temporaries. 
Finally, the Association's argument that the permanent and temporary 
officers should be placed in a single unit because they share a community of 
interest is not before us in this improper practice proceeding. Such a 
proposition can only be presented in a representation proceeding that is 
brought at the appropriate time. 
In Demand 19 the Association addresses a practice of the Authority to 
assign bridge and tunnel officers who operate a manned traffic lane the 
additional simultaneous responsibility of assisting at an unmanned traffic 
lane in the event of a malfunction of the automatic equipment at the 
unmanned lane. While both responsibilities are appropriate duties for a 
Bridge and Tunnel Officer, it is the contention of the Association that the 
simultaneous assignment of both responsibilities involves employee workload 
Board - U-6024 -4 
and is, therefore, a term and condition of employment of the bridge and 
tunnel officers. The legitimacy of the employees' concern is, according to 
the Association, increased by the fact that a bridge and tunnel officer is 
subject to discipline for leaving the manned toll collection booth to which 
he 4 s assigned and is responsible for— anyshortages that occur while he is 
occupied elsewhere. 
The Association's argument that its demand is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation because it involves employee workload has been considered by us 
and rejected in Town of Oyster Bay, 12 PERB 1(3086 (1979). In that case, the 
employer required sanitation workers who collect rubbish to collect bundled 
newspapers at the same time, and to place the bundled newspapers in baskets 
. welded to the sides of the garbage trucks. Finding that both the collection 
of rubbish and the placement of bundled newspapers in the baskets were the 
responsibility of the sanitation workers, we concluded that the simultaneous 
assignment of these responsibilities to the sanitation men was not a 
mandatory subject of negotiation. 
The employee organization representing those sanitation workers could 
not insist that the workers be excused from performing both jobs 
simultaneously, but it could insist upon the negotiation of demands designed 
to relieve the impact of the employer's unilateral decision regarding the 
simultaneous assignment of both responsibilities. The same is true in the 
instant case. The Association may not insist upon the negotiation of a 
demand relieving bridge and tunnel officers of the simultaneous 
responsibility for more than one traffic lane, but it may insist upon 
j demands designed to relieve the impact of such assignments. 
€$868 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Association to withdraw Demands 9 and 19 
from further consideration under the impasse procedures 
set forth in §209 of the Taylor Law. 
DATED: November 16, 1982 
New York, New York 
fl*4H^u*^_^< 
Harold It. Newman, Chairman 
ci&U tj2^L^t^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 2/ 
David C. Randies, Member 
2/ 
— The decision in this case is based upon the conclusion of the Board 
in Monroe-Woodbury Teachers Association, 10 PERB 1(3029 (1977), that the 
presentation of a nonmandatory subject of negotiation to a fact finder 
constitutes improper insistence. Board Member Klaus wrote a dissenting 
opinion. She concurs in the instant decision for the reason stated in 
her concurring opinion in Hudson Valley Cbmmuhity College, 12 PERB 113030 
(1979), that she does not wish to continue to dissent in each case of this 
type which may come before the Board. 
„,JR€1 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF MASSENA, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL UNION 1 2 4 9 , INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF ELECTRICAIr^WORKERS7^F^L-CIO 
Petitioner. 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, ESQS. (R. DANIEL 
BORDONI, ESQ., of Counsel), for Employer 
BLITMAN & KING, ESQS. (CHARLES E. BLITMAN, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Town of Massena (Town) 
to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) determining that nonsupervisory personnel employed 
by the Town's Electric Department (Department) are employees within the 
meaning of §201.7 of the Taylor Law.— The Department is a municipal 
utility which first began operating on May 8, 1981. It employs 16 
nonsupervisory employees who are awaiting classification by the Civil 
Service Department of St. Lawrence County. 
The Town asserts that until they are classified, the employees should 
not enjoy Taylor Law representation rights because the classification 
process may establish job qualifications for which current employees may not 
i/The Director determined that there should be two units of employees •-
of the Department, one consisting of white-collar workers, the other of 
blue-collar workers. There are no exceptions to his unit determination. 
•fe'3870 
#2011/16/82 
CASE NO. C-2431 
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qualify, and some may thus lose their jobs. According to the Town, the 
bestowal of Taylor Law representation rights must await the appointment of a 
permanent staff of employees whose qualifications meet standards that are 
yet to be set. 
This contention was considered by the Director and properly rejected by 
him. The employees of the Department have been hired for an indefinite but 
continuing term of employment, subject to possible replacement on the basis 
of future circumstances that may or may not come to pass before what appears 
to be two or three years. As such, they are employees within the meaning of 
§201.7 of the Taylor Law. Although some of them might lose their positions 
once the classification process is completed, §§202 and 203 of the Taylor 
2/ 
Law grant them representation rights during the interim.-
Having determined that the personnel of the Department are Taylor Law 
employees and are entitled to representation in one of two units, the 
Director ordered an election by secret ballot, "unless Local 1249, IBEW, 
AFL-CIO, the petitioner herein, submits . . . evidence to satisfy the 
requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules of this Board for certification 
without an election." Adopted pursuant to §207.2 of the Taylor Law, which 
requires this Board to ascertain public employees' choice of an employee 
organization "on the basis of dues deduction authorizations and other 
evidences, or, if necessary, by conducting an election", the Rule requires 
certification without an election of an employee organization "if a majority 
of the employees within the unit have indicated their choice by the 
execution of dues deduction authorization cards which are current, or by 
individual designation cards which have been executed within six months 
) i7In Somers, 12 PERB 1(3068 (1979), we held that CETA employees are 
covered by the Taylor Law even though their appointment is subject to ;an 
18-month maximum. ' --Z' 
Board - C-2431 -3 
prior to the certification" and "the choice available to the employees in a 
negotiating unit is limited to the selection or rejection of a single 
employee organization . . . ." 
The Town excepts to the quoted language of the Director's order. It 
argues that only an election would be an effective means of ascertaining the 
choice of its employees. Certification without an election, it states, is 
inappropriate in the instant case because Local 1249's showing of interest 
was obtained after Local 1249 incorrectly advised unit employees that if 
they organized, they would be assured of their jobs notwithstanding Civil 
3/ Service Law examination requirements.-
We reject this exception. We note that certification without an 
election will depend upon the submission of new evidence of support of 
Local 1249. Should it be submitted, we would find no basis in the record 
for rejecting it. The Town could have dissipated, and still may be able to 
do so, any effect of Local 1249's alleged misstatements by giving 
appropriate correct information to the employees. Thus an election would be 
necessary only if Local 1249 does not submit new evidence to satisfy the 
requirements of certification without an election. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that an election by secret ballot be held 
under the supervision of the Director among the 
employees in the two units found appropriate by him who 
were employed on the payroll date immediately preceding 
the date of this decision unless Local 1249 submits 
evidence to him within ten days of the receipt of this 
decision to satisfy the requirements of Rule 
201.9(g)(1) for certification without an election. 
2/we do not here review the Director's determination that the showing,; 
of interest was sufficient. State of New York (Division of State Policed, 
15 PERB 1(3014 (1982). 
Of** 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department submit to the 
Director and to Local 1249 within ten days of receipt 
of this decision alphabetized lists of all employees 
within the two units who were employed on the payroll 
date immediately preceding the date of this decision. 
DATED: November 16, 1982 
New York, New York 
X ^arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Yjc^^t^Z^^ 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
: #2D-ll/16/82 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
FIREFIGHTERS, AFL-CIO, Local 628, CASE No. D-0218 
Upon the Charge of Violation of 
Section 210.1 of the Civil Service Law. 
BELSON, CONNOLLY & BELSON, ESQS. (THOMAS 
F. DE SOYE, ESQ., of Counsel), Attorneys 
for IAFF, AFL-CIO, Local 628 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the Motion of the International Association of 
Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 628 (Local 628) for an order restoring :to it the 
dues deduction rights suspended by our decision and order of November 20, 1981 
(14 PERB 1f3090). 
Local 628's dues and agency shop fee deduction privileges have been 
suspended because it violated §210.1 of the Civil Service Law (the Taylor Law) 
in that it engaged in a two-day strike against the City of Yonkers from 
April 15, 1981 to April 17, 1981. We ordered that the dues deduction 
privileges of Local 628 "be suspended indefinitely, commencing on the first 
practicable date, provided that it may apply to this Board at any time one 
year after the initiation of such suspension for full restoration of such 
privileges''. 
Local 628 has submitted an affidavit verified on October 25, 1982, 
requesting restoration of the dues deduction privilege and affirming that it 
Board - D-0218 -1 
does not assert the right to strike against any government, and we have ascer-
tained that it has not engaged in, caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned 
or threatened a strike against the City of Yorikers since the date of the above-
stated violation. 
The strike charge herein was filed by the Chief Legal Officer of the City. 
As a result of settlement discussions, the actual suspension of the check-off 
privileges commenced on September 10, 1981 in anticipation that this BoardT would 
accept the settlement proposal. The Board thereafter accepted the settlement. 
The application therefore comes to us more than one year after the actual sus-
pension of Local 628's deduction privileges. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the indefinite suspension of the dues and 
agency shop fee deduction privileges of the International Association of 
Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 628 be, and it hereby is, terminated. 
DATED: New York, New York 
November 16, 1982 
^T^rnt^^>r^At&M^y&^^L _ . 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2E-11/16/82 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Respondent, 
CASE NOS. U-5846 & U-5912 
-and-^  "'" """" 
BUFFALO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
JOSEPH P. McNAMARA, ESQ. (ANTHONY C. VACCARO, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
SARGENT & REPKA, ESQS. (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Buffalo Police 
Benevolent Association (PBA) to a hearing officer's decision dismissing its 
two charges against the City of Buffalo (City). The first charge alleges 
that the City violated subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of §209-a.l of the 
Taylor Law by transferring Robert P. Meegan, Jr. from precinct 15 to 
precinct 10 in that he was transferred by Police Commissioner Cunningham 
because (1) he brought a motion to expel Cunningham from membership in PBA, 
which motion was carried by the PBA membership; (2) along with 25 other unit 
employees, he picketed a cocktail party honoring the Mayor of the City of 
Buffalo; and (3) he wrote letters to the editor of the Buffalo Evening News 
which appeared in that newspaper and which complained about the City's 
u. 5*876 
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negotiation posture. The second charge alleges that the City violated 
subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of §209-a.l of the Taylor Law by transferring 
Mark Sadlocha from precinct 12 to precinct 4 in that he was transferred 
because he seconded Meegan's motion to expel Cunningham from PBA and he 
picketed the City on a separate occasion. 
The dec ision to transfer Meegan- and-Sadlocha was made -by Cunn ihgham r 
The issue presented by the charge is whether it was made in retaliation for 
their having engaged in activities protected by the Taylor Law (§209-a.l [a] 
and [c]), or constituted interference with the administration of PBA 
<§209-a.l[b]). 
The hearing officer determined that the record does not support a 
conclusion that Cunningham transferred Meegan and Sadlocha because they 
engaged in protected activities. Underlying this determination is his 
conclusion that their role in the expulsion of Cunningham from PBA was not 
protected as "it constitutes nothing more than an internal union matter 
beyond the jurisdiction of this Board." Regarding the separate picketing 
incidents involving Meegan and Sadlocha, and Meegan*s letter to the editor, 
the hearing officer found insufficient evidence in the record to relate them 
to the transfers. He also concluded that the transfers did not constitute 
interference with the administration of PBA because ''the record is devoid of 
any evidence that the respondent's action compromised the independence of 
charging party . . . ." 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the hearing officer's conclusion 
that there is insufficient evidence to establish that Meegan was transferred 
either because of his letter to the editor or his role in picketing the 
Mayor. Similarly, it does not support a conclusion that Sadlocha was 
Board - U-5846 and U-5912 -3 
transferred because of his role in picketing the City.— 
We reject the hearing officer's conclusion of law that an allegation that 
a public employer retaliated against public employees because it wished to 
punish them for motions they made at a union meeting concerning union 
membership practices is beyond the jurisdiction of this Board. Such 
-retaliatory--action would -coerce the public employees^ in- the -exercise—of—their -
right to participate in the organization, thereby violating §209-a.l(a), and 
would constitute intrusion in the internal affairs of PBA, thereby 
2/ 
compromising its independence and violating §209-a.l(b).— 
Because of this conclusion, we must reach the question, not considered by 
the hearing officer, whether Meegan and Sadlocha were transferred because of 
their role in expelling Police Commissioner Cunningham from membership in 
±/ Participation in informational picketing of this kind is protected by 
§§202 and 203 of the Taylor Law. The hearing officer's opinion expresses some 
doubts about this but his doubts are based upon a misunderstanding of our 
decision in City of Troy, 4 PERB 113062 (19 71) . In that case, we dismissed a 
charge by the City that the Firefighters' Association violated its duty to 
negotiate in good faith by picketing a store owned by the Mayor saying, 
[W]e do not make any ruling here that the picketing was proper or that 
the picketing was not in violation of any law. Rather, we simply 
conclude that the picketing here did not constitute a refusal to 
negotiate in good faith. 
However, the issue in Troy was whether the picketing of a private business 
violated the Taylor Law, while here, the issue is whether an employer may 
discriminate against employees because they engage in picketing, the legality 
of which is not placed in question. 
-^ 'See County of Rockland, 13 PERB 113089 (1980), in which we held that 
§209-a.l(b) of the Taylor Law was "designed to prevent a public employer from 
meddling in the internal affairs of the organization . . . ." 
Board - U-5846 and U-5912 
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PBA. The evidence does not support such a conclusion. It reasonably 
indicates that Cunningham knew of his expulsion from PBA in July 1981, that 
he was angered by it, and that he knew that Meegan and Sadlocha, respectively, 
made and seconded the motion to expel him. It does not follow, however, 
that Cunningham's transfer of Meegan five months later, or his transfer of 
Sadlocha two months thereafter, constituted retaliation -for -the resented 
expulsion. 
The record shows that Cunningham reassigns employees frequently, 
sometimes on a daily basis and certainly on a weekly basis. It is therefore 
not reasonable to believe that Cunningham would have waited so long to 
transfer Meegan and Sadlocha if, as alleged by PBA, it were in retaliation 
for his expulsion. Moreover, Cunningham's testimony that he transferred 
Meegan to the tenth precinct because of a shortage of personnel in that 
3/ precinct is neither refuted nor inherently unbelievable.- Similarly, 
there is no refutation of his testimony that he transferred Sadlocha, along 
with several fellow employees assigned to the twelfth precinct, in order to 
break up cliques which had affected staff discipline. 
In conclusion, we find that the charge alleges that Meegan and Sadlocha 
were transferred because they engaged in three activities on behalf of PBA; 
that all of these activities are protected by the Taylor Law; but that the 
record does not establish the allegations. 
=2/Cunningham testified about discussions he had with several police 
officers concerning the transfer. They were not called upon to refute his 
testimony. The only responsive evidence submitted by PBA was that after 
Meegan was transferred into the tenth precinct, another officer was 
transferred from that precinct to the Narcotics Bureau. Other policemen, 
from other precincts, were transferred to the Narcotics Bureau at the same 
time. Standing alone, this evidence does not shake the credibility of * 4 
Cunningham's testimony that the tenth precinct was short staff. 
Board - U-5846 and U-5912 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: November 16, 1982 
New York, New York 
Zw^^XTy^^v^ 
Harold R^-NewmanvGhalrman 
Ida K-ibaus, Member 
" mm 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES -
RENSSELAER, COLUMBIA, GREENE COUNTIES, 
Employer, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 





CASE NO. C-2440 
On April 1, 19 82, the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL/CIO (petitioner) filed, in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure of the New York State Public Employment 
Relations Board, a timely petition for certification as the exclu-
sive negotiating representative of certain employees employed by 
the Board of Cooperative Educational Services - Rensselaer, Columbia, 
Greene Counties. 
The parties executed a consent agreement wherein they stipulated 
that the negotiating unit would be as follows: 
Included: All full and part time non-instructional 
employees working in the following areas: 
administrative, operational services, 
school monitors, bus attendants and bus 
drivers. 
Excluded: All other employees of the employer, 
specifically all those working in the 
professional area as well as Bridenbeck 
(Clerk), Chartrand (Senior Typist), Decker 
(A/C Clerk), Haskins (Typist), Sweet 
(Clerk), Van Blarcom (Int. Auditor), Heintz 
(Cleaner), Kennedy (Substitute Bus Attendant), 
and the occupational and physical therapists.. 
Pursuant to the consent agreement and in order for the petitioner 
to demonstrate its majority status, a secret ballot election was held 
Board - C-2440 -2 
on October 19, 1982. The results of the election indicate that 
a majority of the eligible voters in the stipulated unit do not 
1/ 
desire to be represented by the petitioner. 
• THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated: New York,; New(York 
November 16, 1982 
^-fn*^e^2/ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
c^ <*— /C^ -^c^ a^-— 
Ida Klaus, Member 
Efavid C. Randies, Member/ 
1/ Of the 99 ballots cast, 36 were for and 63 against repre-
sentation by the petitioner. ' 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTH TONAWANDA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
NORTH TONAWANDA UNITED TEACHERS, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the North Tonawanda United 
Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by 
a majority of the employees of the above named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers who 
have received a reasonable assurance. 
of continuing employment as referenced 
in Civil Service Law, §201.7(d). 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the North Tonawanda United 
Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO and enter into a written agreement 
with such employee organization with regard to terms and 
conditions of employment, and shall negotiate collectively with 
such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances. 
DATED: November 15, 198 2 
New York, New York 
-=£ yg^>-yiJ^>--l^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/jLjuu-a— 
Ida KISLUS, Member 
David C R a n d i e s , Memb 
fc 9884 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SAYVILLE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
SAYVILLE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
..- AET.V_AFL:-Cm,__ ..__ 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Sayville Teachers Associa-
tion, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above named public employer, 
in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Per diem substitute teachers who have 
received and responded affirmatively 
to the letter of reasonable assurance 
issued by the Sayville Union Free 
School District. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
. - %•<•:• irf&'GK-
//3B-11/16/82 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Sayville Teachers Association, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of, 
grievances. 
DATED: November 15, 1982 
New York, New York 
i^Uc^ A, A/ktt ^T-M.^Vr-VT,-^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
£ « - g T 
Ida K l a u s , Member 
David C. R a n d i e s , NMember 
-4 \j>\jt\J-
